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The  stability  of  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium  of  a  simple  asset  market 
model  is  studied  in  a  situation  where  a  group  of  traders  learn  about  the  relationship 
between  the  price  and  return  on  the  asset  using  ordinary  least  squares  estimation, 
and  then  use  their  estimates  in  predicting  the  return  from  the  price.  The  model 
which  they  estimate  is  a  well-specified  model  of  the  rational  expectations 
equilibrium,  but  a  misspecified  model  of  the  situation  in  which  the  traders  are 
learning.  It  is  shown  that  for  appropriate  values  of  a  stability  parameter  the 
situation  converges  almost  surely  to  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium,  Journal 
of Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  022,  026. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
This paper addresses  the question of  convergence to  rational  expectations 
equilibrium.  It  has been claimed that  agents  can learn how to  form rational 
expectations.  Grossman and  Stiglitz  [5]  write  that,  if  expectations are not 
rational  and  the  stochastic  process of  the  underlying  random  variables is 
stationary, 
an  individual  will  eventually  observe  that  the  frequency  distribution  of  returns, 
conditional  on  the  observable  variables,  is  different  from  the  subjective  distribution, 
and  accordingly,  ought  to revise  his  expectations. 
This statement is very  plausible. However,  even if  it  is accepted, it  does not 
imply  that  the  revised  expectations  are  rational,  or  even’ that  multiple 
revisions eventually  lead to  rational  expectations.  The  difficulty  is that  in 
many  models  with  rational  expectations  equilibria  (including  that  of 
*  This  paper  owes  much  to  J.  A.  Mirrlees  and  J.  E.  Stiglitz,  who  supervised  the  thesis  from 
which  it  is  taken.  I  am  also  grateful  to  K.  W.  S.  Roberts  and  D.  Gale  for  the  comments  they 
gave  in  the  course  of  examining  the  thesis.  D.  M.  Kreps  and  J.  M.  Harrison  were  extremely 
helpful  on  probability  theory.  R.  Radner’s  detailed  comments  were  invaluable  in  revising  the 
paper.  All  responsibility  for  errors  of  course  rests  with  me. 
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Grossman  and  Stiglitz  [5])  the  objective  distribution  of  variables  depen 
upon  agents’  subjective  beliefs  about  the  distribution  Outside  a  ratio 
expectations  equilibrium  the  objective  distribution  of  variables  differs  both 
from  agents’  subjective  beliefs,  and  from  the  objective  distribution  which 
would  prevail  in  a rational  expectations  equilibrium.  Agents  may  learn  about 
the  relationship  between  variables,  given  their  current  behefs.  However,  when 
they  modify  their  beliefs  in  the  light  of  what  they  have  learned,  the 
relationship  changes.  Agents  may  attempt  to  learn  about  the  relationship, 
using  Bayesian  or  classical  statistical  techniques  which  are  based  on  a 
correct  specification  of  the  rational  expectations  ~n~~~~~i~rn.  In  doing  so 
they  fail  to  take  into  account  the  dependency  of  outcomes  on  beliefs.  Their 
estimation  technique  is  based  on  a  misspecification  of  the  situation.  For 
example,  in  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium  of  the  asset  market  model 
studied  in  this  paper,  the  price  and  return  on the  asset  at different  dates  form 
an  i.i.d.  sequence  of normal  random  variables.  In  this  situation  ordinary  ieast 
sqaares  is  an  appropriate  statistical  procedure  for  learning 
price-return  relationship.  However,  suppose  that  agents  in  the  m 
IL%  (or  any  other  statistical  procedure)  to  estimate  the  price-return 
lationship  outside  the  rational  expectations  equilibriums  and  use  their 
estimates  in  forecasting  returns.  The  stochastic  process  of  price  and  return  Is 
then  neither  stationary,  nor  independent.  The  use  of  OLS  e~t~rnat~o~  is  inap- 
propriate. 
FulEy  rational  agents  should  estimate  a  correctly  specified  model,  which 
takes  into  account  the  feedback  from  forecasts  to  outcomes.  This  is  likely  to 
entail  a  complicated  learning  strategy  based  on  a  considerable  degree  of 
understanding  of  the  situation.  Outside  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium, 
it  is  not  usually  rational  to  use  estimation  techniques  which  are  based  on  a 
correct  specification  of  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium,  such  as  OLS  in 
the  model  considered  here.  Nevertheless  the  use  of  such  techniques  might  be 
described  as  reasonable.  The  major  propositions  of  this  paper  establish 
conditions,  for  the  model  presented  here,  under  which  8LS  estimation 
ultimately  generates  rational  expectations. 
The  model  is  basically  an  infinitely  repeated  version  of  the 
rossman-Stiglitz  [5,  61 model  of  an  asset  market  with  inbrmed  and  unin- 
ormed  traders.  As  in  the  Grossman-Stiglitz  model,  the  informed  agents  in 
this  model  know  how  to  form  rational  expectations,  given  the  information 
available  to  them.  In  the  Grossman-Stiglitz  model  the  un-nformed  traders 
aiso  form  rational  expectations  about  return,  given  the  price.  In  this  model, 
however,  the  uninformed  traders  lack  the  knowledge  about  the  structure  of 
their  world  needed  to  form  rational  expectations.  stead  they  estimate  the 
price-return  relationship  from  past  history,  using  LS  regre~§ion~  and  u.se 
their  estimates  in  forecasting  return  from  price. 
Two  learning  processes  are  studied.  In  the  first,  agents  revise  the  estimates 320  MARGARETBRAY 
used  in  forecasting  return  at  infrequent  intervals.  In  the  second,  they  revise 
the  estimates  each  time  a  new  data  point  is  observed.  In  both  cases 
conditions  are  derived  under  which  expectations  are,  in  the  limit,  rational. 
The  model  is described  in  Section  2. Section  3  contains  a discussion  of the 
relationship  between  forecasts  and  expectations.  The  major  propositions  on 
learning  are  in  Section  4.  The  nature  of  the  parameter  which  determines 
whether  the  learning  processes  converge  is  discussed  in  Section  5.  Section  6 
concludes  the  paper.  See  Blume  et al.  [ 11, for  a  discussion  of  the  related 
literature. 
2.  THE MODEL 
The  model  is  simple  and  special.  There  are  two  types  of traders,  Ni  2  0 
informed  traders  and  N,  >  0  uninformed  traders.  Both  types  of  traders 
observe the  market  pricep,  at  t,  and  the  return  on the  asset rt  at  a date  after  t 
but  before  t +  1.  In  addition  the  informed  traders  observe  information  I,  at t. 
Information  It  may  be  a  vector  or  a  scalar  random  variable.  The  asset  is 
supplied  in  quantity  s,  at t.  Demand  is  a  function  of the  asset price  and  of 
traders’  point  or  mean  predictions  of the  return.  Under  the  assumptions  of 
the  model  the  informed  traders  need  use only  their  private  information  It  in 
forming  predictions  which  are  rational  expectations,  in  the  sense of being  the 
correct  conditional  expectations  of return  given  all  the  variables,  past  and 
present,  observed  by  the  informed  traders.  The  uninformed  traders  forecast 
return  from  price  on  the  basis  of  their  estimates  of  the  price-return 
relationship  derived  from  past  history  using  ordinary  least  squares. 
ASSUMPTION  1.  It  is common knowledge that  {(It,  rt,  sJ}  is a sequence 
of independent, identically  distributed,  multivariate  normal, random variables 
which are exogenously determined. 
Assumption  1 ensures  that,  if  traders  do  not  revise  their  beliefs  about  the 
price-return  relationship,  (p,,  r,)  is  a sequence  of i.i.d.  random  variables. 
ASSUMPTION  2.  Each  informed trader  demands 
where  Bi  is  a  strictly  positive  constant,  and  H,-,  =  {(I,,  pl,  rl)  ..a 
(I,-  1  9  Pt-  I y rt--.l  )I  is the history  of prices, returns and information  known by 
the informed traders at  t -  1. 
This  is  essentially  an  ad  hoc  specification  of  the  demand  function. 
However,  it  will  be  shown  that  the  conditional  distribution  of rt  given  the STABILITY  oF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  321 
information  available  to  the  informed’  traders  is  normal  with  constant 
variance.  The  demand  function  can  thus  be derived  from  a constant  abso~~~te 
risk  aversion  utility  function,  in  which  case 
8; =  l/[risk  aversion  x  var(y,  / N,-  1, P,, pf>]. 
Note  that  the  informed  traders  are  assumed  to  have  rational  expectat~o~s~ 
The  following  assumption  will  be  shown  to  imply  that  these  expectations  in 
fact  depend  only  on I,. 
AMJMPTION  3.  It  is  common  knowledge  that 
Jv, I  I,,  St)  =  m, I  ItI.  (2.2) 
Assumption  3  ensures  that  the  informed  traders  can  learn  nothing  about  7, 
from  s,  which  they  do  not  already  know  from  1,.  The  assumption  certainly 
holds  when  s, is  a component  of P,,  but  is  also  true  in  other  circumsta~ces~ 
ASSUMPTION  4.  Each  uninformed  trader  demands 
(2.3) 
where  9,  is  a positive  constant,  and  the  uninformed  traders  forecast  Y, by 
@(r,Ih,-I,~,)=a,-l  +b,-I~,.  (2.4) 
Theforecasting  coefjcients  a,-,  and  b,-,  arefunctions  ofhi-,  =  {(pl,  Y,),#~*, 
(ptel,  r,-,)},  the  history  of  price  and  return  known  by  the  uninformed 
traders  at  t -  1. 
It  will  be  shown  that  there  are  numers  a*  and  b*  such  that,  if a,_ i  =  a* 
and  b 1-1 =  b*,  the  forecast  is  the  rational  expectation,  in  the  sense of being 
the  correct  conditional  expectation  of pt,  given  the  information  available  to 
the  uninformed  traders  at t.  In  these  circumstances  the  conditional 
distribution  of rf is  normal  with  constant  variance,  and  the  demand  is  that 
which  would  be  generated  by  a  constant  absolute  risk  aversion  utiiity 
function.  However,  in  general  a,-  r f  a*  and  b,-,  f  b*,  the  forecasts  using 
these  co&cients  are not  in  any  sense rational  expectations. 
ASS~.JMPTI~N  5.  It  is  common  knowledge  that  the  market  clears,  ana  that 
the  market  clearing  price  pt  is  determined  by  supply  s,,  i~f~rrnatio~  1:.  and 
the past  history  of  information,  price  and  return  H,-,  . 
Note  that  he history  observed  by  the  informed  traders,  M,-  L  9 includes  the 
history  observed  by  the  uninformed  traders,  hi-  1. 322  MARGARETBRAY 
3.  FORECASTS  AND  EXPECTATIONS 
The two  propositions in this section clarify  the nature of  traders’ forecasts 
and expectations.  The  market  is said to  be in  temporary  equilibrium  at  t  if 
the asset market clears, in which  case 
Note  that  in  temporary  equilibrium  the  uninformed  traders  do  not,  in 
general, form rational  expectations. 
PROPOSITION  1.  In  the  temporary  equilibrium  the  informed  traders’ 
conditional  expectations of  rt  depend only  on  their  current  information I,. 
That  is, 
W,  I H,-  1  7  It,  PJ  =  E(r,  / 1,).  (3.2) 
ProoJ  Assumption 5 implies that  the informed traders realize that pt  is a 
function  of  H,-,,  I,  and  st  and  so  that  E(r,  1  H,-  1, It,  s,, p,)  = 
E(r,  )  H1- 1, I,,  st). Assumption  1 implies that  (It,  rt,  sJ is independent of past 
history  Ht-  1, and so that  E(r,  1  Hf-  1  , II,  s,) = E(r,  ) It,  st) = E(r,  IIt)  (using 
Assumption 3).  Thus  E(r,  1  H,-  1, I,,  sI, p,)  =  E(r,  / it).  Taking  conditional 
expectations  over  st  given  (H,-,  , I,,  pr)  implies that  E(r,  1  Hf-,  , I,,  pt) = 
E(r,  1  It).  1 
An  identical  argument  can  be  used  to  show  that  the  conditional 
distribution  of  r,  given  (H,_,  , I,,  pt)  is  the  same  as  the  conditional 
distribution  of  rt  given It.  As  (It,  r,)  is i.i.d.  normal  (Assumption  l),  this 
conditional  distribution  is normal with  constant variance. 
Proposition  1 makes it  possible to  write pr  explicitly  as a function  using 
(3.1)  and (3.2): 
Xt+Nu&p-l 
pt=  (N,8,  ~ NiBi)-N,‘,b,~,  ’  (3.3) 
where 
x,  = N,BiE(r,  J  I,)  -So.  (3.4) 
The  estimated regression coefficients a,-,  and b,-,  are functions  of  past 
history  h,-  1. From  Assumption 1  they  are  independent of  (It,  rt,  s,).  The 
term X, is a linear function  of  (I,,  rt,  sJ.  Thus (rt,  xt)  is bivariate  normal and STABILITY  OF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  323 
Xf  is  independent  of  h, _ 1.  Thus  E(r,  ) h,-  1  3  pJ  =  E(r,  / xt).  Xow 
E(r,  / xt)  =  Er,  if  var  X* =  0,  and  if  var  xt  >  0 
E(r,  I xt>  =  Er,  + co;;;xf’  (xt -Ex& 
t 
Eliminating  xt  from  (3.3)  and (3.5)  establishes  Proposition 2. 
PROPOSITION  2. 
(3.6) 
a:-, =  Er,  -  (k/N,  8,)  Ext  -  kal-  j > 
b;-,=k(Niei+N,B,)/N,8,-kbt_,, 
k=O  if  varx,  =o 
(3.7) 
(3.8) 
=  N,  0,  CQV(Y~, xt) 
var x, 
lj-  VW  x,  >  0. 
(3.8) 
The  informed  traders  always  form  rational  expectations  in  this  model. 
Thus the  market  is in  a rational  expectations equilibrium  if  the uninformed 
traders also form rational  expectations. 
DEFINITION.  The  market  is in  a rational  expectations  eq~i~ibr~~rn  if  it  is 
in temporary  equilibrium and if  in  addition the uninformed traders’ forecasts 
are the correct  conditional  expectation  of  Y!,  give h,-,  and  pr . This requires 
that  for  all values of pt 
It  follows immediately  from  (2.4)  and (3.6) that  in a rational  expectations 
equilibrium  a,-  1  =  ai-  1 and  b,_ I =  b;-  1.  It  is easy to  verify  Proposition 3 
from  (3.7)  and (3.8). 
~ROPOSlTlON  3.  A  rational  expectations  equilibrium  aisis  if  k  #  -1. 
The  equilibrium  is unique.  In  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium 
b t-,=b;-,=b”= 
k(N,  Bj f  N,  f3,) 
(l+k)NuQ,  .  (3.19) 324  MARGARETBRAY 
Note  that  if  k  =  -1  and  b,-,  =  bi-,  (3.8)  implies  that  (N,di  +  N,8,)/ 
(N,f?,)  =  0.  This  is  impossible  as  it  has  been  assumed  that  Ni  >  0,  N,,  >  0, 
Bi >  0,  and  8,  >  0.  Thus  if  k  =  -1  no  rational  expectations  equilibrium 
exists.  This  is  similar  to  other  non-generic  examples  of the  non-existence  of 
rational  expectations  equilibrium  (e.g.,  Kreps  [8]). 
4.  ORDINARY  LEAST  SQUARES  LEARNING 
Equations  (3.6),  (3.7),  (3.8),  (3.10)  and  (3.11)  establish  that  the 
relationship  between  price  and  return  is  of the  form 
where 
Y,=U;-,  +  &,p,  +  u,,  (4.1) 
Ut =  rt -  w,  I xt),  (4.2) 
a ;-l=(l+k)a*-ka,-,,  (4.3) 
b,‘-,=(l  +k)b*-kb,-,.  (4.4) 
The  variables  {Us} form  a sequence  of i.i.d.  normal  random  variables;  U, is 
independent  of past  history  and  in  particular  of ai-  I  and  bj-  r.  As  (rt,  x,)  is 
normal,  (4.2)  implies  that  nt  is  independent  of  x1,  If  alPI  and  bi-,  were 
constants  over  time  equal  to  a;  and  b;,  the  conditions  of  both  the 
Gauss-Markov  theorem  (Johnston  [ 7]),  and  the  assumptions  of  Zellner  [S] 
under  which  OLS  constitutes  a  Bayesian  learning  procedure,  would  be 
satisfied.  The  regression  coefficients  when rl  is regressed linearly  on pt  would 
converge  in  probability  and  almost  surely  to  aA and  b;.  If  the  initial  forecast 
rule  yielded  rational  expectations,  (a,  =  a*  and  b,  =  b*),  OLS  estimation 
would  confirm  that  the  expectations  were rational,  as  in  this  case  ai =  a* 
and  b;  =  b*.  An  outside  observer  could  appropriately  use  OLS  to  estimate 
the  price-return  relationship  in  repeated  realizations  of  the  rational  expec- 
tations  equilibrium.  However,  the  uninformed  agents  who  use  OLS  fail  to 
take  into  account  the  fact  that  the  relationship  changes  as they  learn;  their 
estimation  procedure  is  based  upon  a misspecification  of the  situation. 
I  investigate  two  different  regimes  in  which  the  uninformed  agents  use 
estimated  regression  coefficients  in  forecasting.  In  the  first  regime  studied 
traders  initially  forecast  rt  by  @(r, ] h,-,,  pt)  =  a,  +  b,p,.  They  continue  to 
use  this  forecasting  rule  for  a  long  period,  during  which  they  run  a  linear 
OLS  regression  of  rt  on pt.  While  they  use the  original  forecasting  rule  the 
actual  relationship  between  price  and  return  is  rf =  ai  +  b;p,  +  u,.  As  the 
length  of the  estimation  period  tends  to  infinity  the  estimated  values  of  the 
regression  coefficients  converge  almost  surely  to  ah and  b&. At  some  date  all STABILITY  OF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  325 
the  uninformed  traders  simultaneously  drop  the  initial  forecasting  rule2  and 
adopt  the  new rule  ~(r,/h,_,,p,)=a,+b,p,,  where  a,=@,  and  b,=bb. 
They  then  start  to  re-estimate  the  regression  coeffmients,  ultimately  reaching 
new probability  limits  a;  and  b;  and  changing  the  forecasting  rule  again. 
After  the  mth  change  of  forecasting  rule  the  coefficients  are  (aWg b,,j, 
which  are  defined  recursively  by  (a,,  6,)  and  the  difference  equations 
a,==(l+k)a*--a,-,, 
b,=(l  +k)b*-kb,-,. 
The  elementary  theory  of difference  equations  implies: 
(4.53 
(4.6) 
PROPOSITION  4.  If  the  estimates  are  revised  periodically,  and  the 
forecasting  rule  after  the  mth  revision  is given  by  (4.5)  and  (4.6),  expec- 
tatiorts  converge to rationality  (in  the sense  that  a,  tends to a”  and 6,  tends 
to b*)  ifand  only  z~lkl  <  1. 
In  the  second  OLS  procedure  studied,  traders  revise  their  estimates  each 
time  a new data  point  is  observed.  The  resulting,  highly  non-linear  stochastic 
difference  equations  are  hard  to  analyze.  The  problem  is  rendered  tractable 
by  reducing  the  number  of  coefficients  estimated  by  one,  by  assuming  that 
the  traders  know  the  means  of  (p,,  rJ.  If  the  uninformed  traders  believed  the 
means  to  be  (p,  r),  they  would  regress  (rt  -  r)  upon  (p,  -  p).  This  yields  a 
forecasting  rule  of  the  form  @(rt / h,-  I,  PJ =  Y +  bf-  I(pt  -  p).  Comparing 
this  with  (2.4)  shows that  here 
a  t--I  =r-b,-,p.  (4.7) 
These  beliefs  about  the  means  of  (p,,  rJ  are  rational  given  the  past  history 
observed  by  the  uninformed  traders  if  and  only  if  E(r,  i h,-,)  =  r  and 
E(p,  / h,-  ,) =  p.  Since  rf is independent  of past  history  this  requires  that 
r=Er,.  (4.8) 
From  (3.3)  (4.7)  and  (4X),  as x,  is  independent  of k,_,  and  a,_,  an 
are functions  of h,-  1, 
Rearranging  (4.9)  implies  that  p  =  E(p,  / h,-,)  if  and  only  if 
(4.9) 
Ex,  -I- N, O,Er, 
‘=  N,O,+NiOi  ’ 
(4.10) 326  MARGARETBRAY 
Note from  (4.8)  and (4.10) that  as (rtr  x,)  is i.i.d.,  if beliefs about means  are 
correct,  (p,  r)  is not  in  fact  a function  of time  or past history. 
If  the  uninformed traders have rational  expectations about the  means  of 
(p,,  Ye), (3.3)  and (4.10)  imply  that 
xt -  Ex, 
Pt-p=  N,B,+N,B,-N,B,b,_,  * 
(4.11) 
In  one  special case, if  the  uninformed  traders have  rational  expectations 
about the means  of pt  and Ye, they  also have rational  expectations about the 
conditional  mean of  rt  given the information  available to  them, If  var x,  =  0, 
pr =  p  for  all t;  no variation  in the price  is observed, and it  is impossible to 
regress  rt -  Y upon pt  -  p.  The  uninformed traders’ forecast is 
@(r, I h,-,  , PJ  =  r -  b,-  l(pI  -  P>  =  Ert, 
which  is fully  rational,  given that  the constant price  conveys no information. 
Assumption  6 eliminates this exceptional case. 
ASSUMPTION  6. 
var x1 > 0.  (4.12) 
Assumption  7  specifies precisely  how  the  uninformed  agents use past 
history  to  define a forecasting rule. 
ASSUMPTION  7.  The  uninformed  agents forecast  rt  by 
@(r,Ih,-,,~,)=a,-,  +bt-lpt,  (4.13) 
where 
a t-l=Er,-bb,-,Ep,=r-b6,_,p,  (4.14) 
p=Epr=  Ex,  +  N,  8,Er, 
NUB, +  Nisi  1 
and 
b,_,  =  Sob,  +  Xi-’  (Pi-  P)‘Cri-rr) 
S,+C:-‘(Pi-P)’  ’ 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
where 0 <  S,  <  co and  1  b, 1  <  00 describe  the  initial  beliefs  of the uninformed 
traders,  and  are  determined  exogenously  to  the  model. 
If  S,=O  (4.16)  is the  standard  ordinary  least squares formula  for  the 
regressions  of  rr -  r upon pt  -  p  with  zero intercept.  The initial  value b,  can STABILITY  OF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  327 
be  interpreted  as  the  mean,  and  S,/var  ut  as  the  precision  of  a normal  prior 
on  the  coefficient  in  a  Bayesian  regression  (see  Zellner  191)  If  S,  =  0  the 
prior  is  diffuse.  It  should  be  noted  that  the likelihood  function  which  would 
be used to  give  a  Bayesian  interpretation  to  (4.16)  is misspecified in  the 
situation  in  which  all  the  uninformed  traders  are  learning,  just  as the 
classical ordinary  least squares  model is a misspecification of the situation. 
The major proposition  of this paper is: 
PROPOSITION  5.  Given  Assumptions 1-7,  $  k > -I,  where 
k =  N, 8, cov(r,,  x,)/var  xg  , 
then ai and b,  tend to  their  rational  expectations equilibrium values a”  and 
6”  almost surely. In  the limit  expectations are rational. 
Proof.  Prom (3.10),  (3.1 I),  (4.14)  and (4.15)  a, is a continuous f~~~t~o~ 
of b,,  and if b, =  b*> a, =  a*.  Thus it  is sufficient to  show that  b, tends to b” 
almost surely.  This  is demonstrated by  showing that  if  k > -1  and if  S,  is 
defined by 
s,=S, ix  (pi-p)*? 
1 
(4.17) 
(b,, S,)  is  a  time  homogeneous Markov  Process  with  the  following 
properties: 
PROPERTY  1.  The random variable  b, recurs to  every  neighbourhood of 
b*.  That  isSfor any  6 > 0, 
P(j b, -  b* 1  < 6 infinitely  often) =  1. 
In  addition 
P(S,+  CC)  =  1. 
PROPERTY  2.  For  any  71  in  (0, 1)  and arzy  E > 0,  there exist  6 in  (0. C) 
andN>O,suchthatforany(b,S)withIb-b*I<6arrdS>N 
J=(lb,-b*/  <  f  c  or  all  t>Olb,=band  S,=S)>z. 
The following  argument demonstrates  that  these two  properties imply  that 
for  any  E > 0, P(I b, -  b”  1  >  F infinitely  often) =  0,  and  thus that  h, tends to 
b”  almost surely. 
Let  e be any  positive number, let rr be any  number in  (0, 1)  and let 6 and 
N be such that  Property  2 holds. Let E be the event in which S, exceeds  181  at 
some finite  date  and  j  b, -  b*i  subsequently alternates between being  less 
than  6 and greater than E infinitely  often. Property  I  implies that,  if there is a 
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positive  probability  that  )  b, -  b*  1 >  E  infinitely  often,  then  E  has  positive 
probability.  It  will  be  shown  that  E  has probability  zero. 
Let  E,  be the  event  in  which  this  alternion  happens  at  least  y1  times  after 
S,  >  N.  Formally  E,  is  the  event  that  the  stopping  time  t,  is  finite,  where  t, 
is  defined  by 
t,=min{t:Jb,-b*I<&S,>N}, 
tn =  min  I 
lb,-b*l<&t>t,-,, 
t’  (bi -  b*  ( >  E for some  i between t,-  r and t,  * 
Note  that  E,-,  c  E,,  E  =  n  ?I0  E,,  and,  from  Property  1, P(E,)  =  1. 
Let  A,  be  the  event  that  Ibj-b*l  >  E  and  Ibi-b*l  <6  for  some  finite 
i >  j  >  t.  Thus 
P(En+l  14>=P@tnl&)*  (4.18) 
E,  is  the  past  and  A,”  is in  the  future  of the  stopping  time  1,.  Thus  from  the 
strong  Markov  property 
P(bn  IEn)  =  j” P(A  tn 1  btn =  b, Stn =  S)  dF(b,  S I E,),  (4.19) 
where F(b,  S  ) E,)  is the  distribution  function  of (bt,,  Sfn) given  E,.  Note  that 
as  t,  >  0  and,  from  (4.1)  S,  is  increasing,  S,” >  S,  >  N.  By  definition 
I bfn -  b*  j <  6, so the  support  of F  lies  entirely  in  {b, S I I b -  b*  j <  6, S >  N}. 
For  these  values  of  (b, S)  Property  2  and  the  fact  the  (b,,  S,)  is  time 
homogeneous  Markov  implies  that 
J’(&Ibl,,=b,St,,=S)<  1 --n<  1.  (4.20) 
Thus  from  (4.18)-(4.20), 
W,,,  I~,)=W,nIE,)<  l--71 
and  so  as E,cE,+I  and  P(E,)=  1, 
P(E,)  = 
I 
I’I  P(E,  I E,-,  P(E,)  <  (1 -  x)~. 
i=l  i 
Thus  as 71  E  (0,  l), 
P(E)  <  lim  (1 -  n)”  =  0.  n+m 
This  establishes  that  the  theorem  follows  from  Properties  1  and  2. 
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5.  THE  STABILITY  PARAMETER 
The  proof  that  Properties  1  and  2  hold  in  the  Appendix  makes 
use  of  k  >  -1.  If  k<-I  it  is  easy  to  show  that  (b,--b*)’  is  a 
tingale;  that  is,  E((b,  -  b*)*  j b,_,  , S,-,)  >  (b,-,  -  b,)*.  This  suggests,  but 
does  not  prove,  that  if  k  Q  -1,  b,  not  only  fails  to  converge  to  6*,  but  is  also 
unbounded.  If  this  is  so  the  boundary  between  the  two  types  of  behaviour 
occurs  at precisely  the  point  (k  =  -1)  where  there  is  no  rational  expectations 
equilibrium. 
The  parameter  k  is  clearly  crucial.  It  is  defined  in  (3.9),  but  is  not  given 
any  interpretation.  When  the  supply  s,  has  zero  variance  (3.4)  and  (3.9) 
imply  that  k  has  a particularly  simple  form,  k  =  (~~~~i~/(~j#i~.  In  this  case, 
given  a,-  r  and  b,-,  , the  price  is  a linear  function  of  E(r,  j 1,)  and  a sufficient 
statistic  for  the  information.  Thus  in  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium 
-  a*  c  b*pt  =  E(r,  / 1,).  Here  k  is  the  equilibrium  ratio  of  uninformed  to  t- 
informed  demand and  is non-negative.  The  period  by  period  least squares 
learning rule  is therefore  stable. The process  in  which  the forecasting rule  is 
changed only  when the estimates  reach their  probability  limits is stable if  the 
uninformed traders demand less  than  the informed traders in equilibrium, 
If  var  s, > 0, k  can be negative if  the return  on the asset  and its supply  are 
positively  correlated.  From  (3.9) the stability  conditions can be reformulated 
as 
implies that  -1  < k <  1 so both  learning processes  are stable, and 
implies that  -1  < k,  so period ordinary  least squares  learning is stable. Thus 
learning tends to  generate instability  if  either the ratio  N,B,/N,Bi  is large so 
the  uninformed traders dominate the market,  or  the equilibrium value  of  the 
regression  coefficient  of  price on return  b*  is large, 
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  results of  this paper  suggest that  a  learning  method can  event~ali~ 
yield  rational  expectations even if  it  is based upon a misspeci~cation of  the 
mode!  in  the  situation  when  agents are  learning.  However-as  one might 
expect-the  stability  properties  of  the  system  are  different  for  different 
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These results seem  to  lend weight to  the rational  expectations hypothesis. 
However,  it  must be borne in  mind that  expectations are not  rational,  and 
indeed  are  biased  due  to  the  misspecification  of  the  model  which  is 
estimated, at  all  finite  dates. Rational  expectations are, if  anything,  a long 
run rather  than  a short run  phenomenon. 
APPENDIX 
The  Appendix  contains the  proof  that  (b,,  S,)  is a  time  homogeneous 
Markov  process, and  establishes Properties 1  and  2  as Lemmas  4  and  5. 
Lemmas 1-3  are used in  the proof  of  Lemma 4. 
It  is convenient  to  introduce  some more notation,  and use it  to  spell out 
the relationship between (bt, S,)  and (b,-  i,  S,-  i).  The history  of the model is 
determined by  the price  at  each date (4.11),  the estimation rule  (4.16),  the 
initial  values  (b,,  S,)  and  the  realizations  of  the  exogenous i.i.d.  normal 
random variables (rf,  x,).  Let 
vf = (x, -  Ex,)/N,, Bu, 
it  = rt -  W,  I x,1, 
(A-1) 
(A.2) 
c, =  (N,  0, + NiB,)/Nu8,  -  b,,  (A.31 
c* =  (NUB,, + NiBi)/N,,8,  -b*.  (A.41 
From  (3.11) 
c * =  (N,  0, + Ni B,)/(N,  8,( 1 +  k))  =  b */k.  64.5) 
Note  that  ct  is a linear  function  of  b,,  and (c~  -c*)  =  /b, -  b* 1. Note  also 
from  (A.5)  that,  if  k  > -I,  c*  is  strictly  positive.  From  Assumption  1 
{(u,,  u,)}  is a  sequence  of  i.i.d.  zero  mean normal  random variables;  ut  is 
independent  of  vt.  From  Assumption 6  var  U, > 0.  Finally  as  k= 
N,8,  COV(Y,,  x,)/var  xy,  (3.5),  (4.8),  (A.l)  and (A.2)  imply  that 
rt -  r = kv,  + u,,  64.6) 
and from  (4.1 l),  (A-1)  and (A.3) 
P( -  P =  vdct-  1.  (A.71 
Equations (4.16),  (A.5),  (A.6)  and (A.7)  imply  that 
c,  _  c*  =  SO(CO  -  C*>  -  k  C:  (ui/Ci-,)‘(Ci-  1  -  C*>  -  2:  Vi  UJCi-  1  CA  8) 
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Equations  (4.17)  and  (A.8)  can  be  used  to  write  (c,,  3,)  as  a  function  of 
c* ,c  f-i’  s t-19  u,  and  nl: 
c  t _  c* =  (ct-1 -  c*w-1  -  kwCt-l)21  -  Vt%/Ct-I 
St-1  + @t/c,- I)” 
(A.9) 
s,= St-, i- (VJCt-  I>‘.  (Alei) 
These  are  the  equations  which  serve  to  define  the  stochastic  process  (c,,  S,). 
As  c*  is  constant  and  {(u,,  v,))  is  i.i.d.  it  follows  immediately  from  (AS) 
and  (A.10)  that  (c,,  S,)  is  a  time  homogeneous  Markov  Process.  It  is 
obvious  from  (A.3)  and  (A.4)  that  (b,,  S,)  is  also  a  time  homogeneous 
Markov  Process. 
To  complete  that  notation  let  (a,  R,  P)  be the  probability  space  on  which 
all  the  random  variables  are  defined,  and  let  .*  be the  smallest  sub-sigma 
field  of  on  which  (Ye, x1),...,  (rl,  xt)  are  measurable.  Then  5  cF2  *. e and 
(c,,  S,,  u,,  UJ  is  6  but  not  &-,  measurable. 
LEMMA  1.  If  k  f  -1  the  event  in  which  b,_,  tends  to  any  limit  apart 
,from  b”  has  probability  zero. 
The  intuitive  argument  here  is  that  if  the  coefficient  used  in  forecasting 
b,-  L converged  to  6,  the  conditional  expectation  of  r(  -  r  would  converge  to 
((I  +  k)b*  -  kb)(p,-  p).  Thus  the  OLS  estimator  would  converge  to 
(1  -t  k)b”  -  kb.  Unless  b =  b*  this  contradicts  the  original  assumption  that 
b tp,  tends  to b. 
ProoJ  As  jc, -  c*  j =  j  b,-,  -  b”  / the  lemma  can  be  proved  by  showing 
that  c,  almost  surely  does  not  tend  to  any  limit  other  than  c*. 
Suppose  that  there  is  an  event  of  positive  probability  on  which  c, tends  to 
c,  c #  0  and  c #  c*.  If  this  is  so  the  strong  law  of  large  numbers  implies  that 
there  is  an event  G  of  positive  probability  on  which 
Thus  on  G 
+  S  (VJCi-  I)*(Cj&I  -  C*)  --f  (O~/C*)(C  -  C”), 
1 
implying  that  the  right-hand  side  of  (A-8)  tends  to  -k(c  -  c*)  while  the  left- 
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If  c tends  to  0 with  positive  probability,  for  any  E >  0  there  is a date  y1  and 
event  G’  on  which,  for  all  t >  n,  Ict(  <  E, and  using  the  strong  law of large 
numbers 
From  the  Cauchy-Schwarz  inequality 
jf c (UiUJCi-,)  j  <  (wp  (+-  i *:)“‘.  ti+1  Tt+1 
Thus  from  (A.8) 
lcr-(l  +k)c*(<  s,  Ic,  -  (1 +  k)c*I/t  +  Ik(  W,E +  (w,y2(c;+,  uy2 
Stilt  +  wt 
Taking  limits  as  t  tends  to  infinity  all  terms  on  the  right-hand  side  of this 
inequality  tend  to  zero  except 
w,-+  co  and  +  g1  u:+o:. 
Thus  the  right-hand  side  tends  to  (k( E. If  E is  sufficiently  small  and  k #  -1 
this  is  inconsistent  with  the  initial  supposition  that  / ctl  <  E unless  in  fact  c, 
tends  to  c*=O.  1 
Lemma  2  makes  use of the  Martingale  convergence  theorem  possible. 
LEMMA  2.  If  k > -1  there  exist  real functions f  dej%ed on R,  and  g, 
and g,  defined on R + ‘,  with  the following  properties: 
(i)  f  is  continuous,  decreasing  on  x  < 0,  and 
increasing on x  > 0. f  (0) = 0.  (A.ll) 
(ii)  For  all  S >  0, ---co <  g,(S)  < c*  <  g*(S)  <  Co.  (A.12) 
(iii)  For  all  S > 0, g,  is non-decreasing and g,  is non- 
increasing.  (A.13) 
(iv)  ,1im”, g,(S)=  il_mm g,(S)  =c*.  (A.14) 
(4  Ifc,-,  is not in  (g&LA  g2(~t-l)) 
xi-et  -c*>  15-l)  G f(ct-1  -c*>*  (A.15) 
The  function  f  (c, -  c*)  is  a  measure  of  the  “distance”  of  c,  from  c*, 
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surely.  Thus  (A.12)  and  (A.15)  imply  that  f(c,  -  c*)  satisfies  the  supermar- 
tingale  property  except  in  a neighbourhood  of c*.  The  critical  ~eighbourboo~ 
becomes  smaller  as S,-,  increases  (A.13),  collapsing  on  c”  as S,-,  tends  to 
infinity  (A. 14). 
The  rigorous  proof  of this  lemma  is  a  tedious  exercise  in  calculus.  (See 
ray  [ 2 or  3)  for  details.)  The  argument  is  suggested  by  noting  that,  given 
any  c,-,  f  0,  (A.9)  implies  that  if  S,-  r is  sufficiently  large,  c1 is likely  to  be 
closer  to  c*  than  c  t--l.  There  are  apparent  difficulties  when  c,_,  is  close  to 
zero.  In  these  cases  (vJc,-~)~  is  likely  to  be  large,  and  c, -  c*  N 
-k(c,-,  -  c*)  N  kc*.  These  difficulties  are  avoided  by  choosing  f  so  that 
f  (kc*)  < f  (-c*). 
Lemmas  I  and  2  are  used  in  the  proof  of Lemma  3. 
LEMMA  3.  If  k  >  -1  and S,  > 0, c, almost surely  visits (g,(S,),  g,(S,>) 
infinitely  often. 
ProoJ  The  proof  begins  by  showing  that  the  first  date  at  which  G, enters 
(g,(So),  &(SO))~  109 is  almost  surely  finite.  Define  ci  by  c; =  c, if e <  &,, and 
c; =  c t0  if  t>t,.  Note  that  to  is  a  stopping  time,  and  that  cl  is  5 
measurable.  It  follows  immediately  from  Lemma  2,  (A.1 I),  (A,I3)  and 
(A. 15),  that  E(f(cj  -  c*)  15-r)  <  ./‘(c;-~  -  c*);  f(c;  -  c*)  is  a  positive 
supermartingale.  Thus  from  the  Martingale  Convergence  Theorem  (Chung 
f4,  corollary  to  Theorem  9.4.41)  f(c;  -c*)  almost  surely  tends  to  a  finite 
limit. 
If  t,  is infinite  c; =  c, for  all  t, in  which  case, iff(c;  -  c*)  tends  to  a finite 
limit,  f(c,  -  c*)  does  so also.  Given  (A.1  I)  this  implies  that  c!  is  bou~~ed~ 
Now  from  (A.9) 
let-ct-,I= 
(1 +  k)(c,-,  -  c*>v:/t  -i- C:-r”t”JP  I 
c:-liCi  (("ilci-132~ie  +  C:-lSOlt  /. 
Recall  that,  as  (u,,  UJ  is  i.i.d.  normal, 
v:/t-0,  v,uJt  -+  Q,  and  f_-&Ly:,  tL-a  1  almost  surely. 
I 
Thus  if c1 is bounded,  let -  cl-r  j tends  to  zero  almost  surely.  From  (Al  1) if 
S(c,  -  c*)  tends  to  a limit  and  1  c, -  c,-,  j tends  to  zero,  c, tends  to  a limit,  If 
I,  is infinite  c, is not  in  (g](S,),  g2(So))  f  or  any t.  In  this  case (A.12)  im 
that,  as  c*  is  in  (g,(S,),  gASoN,  et  cannot  tend  to  c”.  Thus  if  there  is 
positive  probability  that  to is infinite  there  is positive  probability  that  c, tends 
to  a  limit  other  that  c*.  However,  (Lemma  I)  the  probability  that  c, tends  to 
any  limit  other  that  c*  is  zero,  so  to is  almost  surely  finite. 
Now  define  the  sequence  of stopping  imes  to, t, 9..W  recursively  by  letting  i,, 
be the  first  date  after  t,_,  at  which  c, is  in  (e,(S,),  g,(S,)).  From  (4.17),  S, 334  MARGARETBRAY 
is  non-decreasing  with  time,  so  Sfn >  S,  >  0.  As  (ct, S,)  is  Markov  the 
argument  used to  establish  that  t,  is  finite  establish  that,  if t,  is finite,  t, + I  is 
almost  surely  finite.  Thus  t,  is  almost  surely  finite  for  all  n.  Finally  note 
from  (A.13)  that  as  S,  >  S,,  ( gI(SJ  gZ(Stn))  is  a  subinterval  of 
(g,(So),  &(So)),  so  ctn is  %  (g,(S,),  g2(S0))  for  an  almost  surely  infinite 
sequence  of stopping  times  {t,},  which  proves  the  lemma.  1 
Property  1 is  now established  by  proving  Lemma  4. 
LEMMA  4.  For  any  S >  0 
P( 1  b, -  b * ) < 6 infinitely  often) =  1.  (A.16) 
In  addition 
P(St+  co) =  1.  (A.17) 
ProoJ  The  proof  begins  by  showing  that  (A.1 7)  holds.  Note  from  (A.l) 
and  (A.7)  that  as var u, >  0, p1 -  p #  0  almost  surely,  and  so from  (4.17), 
even  if  S,  =  0,  S,  >  0  almost  surely.  Thus,  as the  process  is  Markov,  the 
dates  can  always  be renumbered  so that  S,  >  0. 
Lemma  3 implies  that  there  is  a sequence  of stopping  times  { tn},  such that 
ctn is in  (g,(S,),  g2(S0))  for  all  y1.  Let 
cm  = max(l  g,(So)L  I g2(So)0  < 02  (A.18) 
Thus  from  (A.lO),  as S,  is  a sum  of non-negative  terms 
(v  (A.19) 
{t,}  is  almost  surely  an  infinite  sequence of stopping  times  defined  relative  to 
the  stationary  independent  stochastic  process  {(u,,  v,)].  Thus  from  the 
optional  stopping  theorem  for  such  processes  (Chung  [4,  Theorem  8.2.31) 
ot,+  r is  a sequence  of i.i.d.  variables  with  the  same  distribution  as v, . As  v, 
has zero  mean  and  strictly  positive  variance 
almost  surely 
and  so from  (A.19)  S,  tends  to  infinity  almost  surely. 
Using  (A.14)  this  implies  that  there  is,  almost  surely,  a finite  date  u  such 
that 
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Renumbering  time  starting  at  U,  and  using  the  Markov  property,  Lemma  3 
implies  that  (c,-c*/<6  infinitely  often.  As  lbl-b*[=/ci-c*/  this 
establishes  that  (A.16)  holds.  u 
Property  2 is  shown  to  hold  by  proving  Lemma  5. 
LEMMA  5.  If  k  >  -1  then for  any  71  in  (0,  i>,  and  any  E >  0,  there  exist2 
6>OandN>O,suchthatforany(~,S)wit~jc--~I~6andS>,hr 
As  let-c*/=(bt-b*l/,  and  the  process  {(c,,  S,)}  is  time  homogeneous 
arkov,  this  is  equivalent  to  Property  2. 
Broof:  Heuristically  the  argument  proceeds  as  follows.  Equation  (A-8) 
shows  that  if  c0 N  c*  and  S,  is  sufficiently  large,  c, N  c*  for  a  long  time 
after  0.  From  (A.9)  if  k  >  -1,  ct is  in  fact  likely  to  move  closer  to  c*  as  time 
progresses.  If  c, E c*  for  a long  time,  the  model  has  been  close  to  its  rational 
expectations  equilibrium,  the  OES  estimator  is  likely  to  be  close  to  its 
rational  expectations  equilibrium  value  b*,  and  so  c,  is  likely  to  continue 
close  to  c*. 
The  lemma  is  proved  by  defining  new  variables  (cd,, e,)  by 
e, =co,  (A.20) 
d --c*=  So(eo-c*)-kCi  (Vi/ei-~>‘(ei-~-c*>-~:Viui/ei-~  t  so + c:  @i/k-l>’ 
and 
e,=c”  +2c  if  d, >  c*  +  2x, 
et =  d,  if  Id,-c*j  <  2e, 
et=?-22E  if  d, <  c*  -  2~. 
(A.22) 
There  is  no  loss  of  generality  in  restricting  attention  to  E <  fc”  (recall  that 
c*  is  strictly  positive).  In  this  case 
These  bounds  will  be used  extensively  later  in  the  proof. 
Comparing  (A.8)  and  (A.20~(A.22)  it  is  clear  that,  if  le, -c*  / <  e, 
t =  1, 2,,..,  T,  then  ct =  d, =  et,  and  so  1  c, -  c*  / <  E for  t =  1, 2 ,...,  i”.  It  can 336  MARGARET  BRAY 
be  shown  by  an  induction  argument  that  if  )  k  1 <  1, sufficient  conditions  for 
)e,--c*J<&,  and  thus  for  )c,-c*j<son  t=l,  2,...,  Tare 
I ~tl < ey  = &Cl -  lkl),  t =  l,...,  T, 
where 
2:  vJei-l 
Yt =  S,  +  2:  (vJeivl)” 
(A.24) 
If  k  >  1,  sufficient  conditions  for  1  e, -  c*  ( <  E, and  thus  for  (  ct -  c*  1 <  E on 
t =  1, 2,...,  T are 
/c,, -  c*l  <  6 z  j&/(1  +  k)), 
1  ytl  <  E, =  j&/(1  +  k),  t =  l,...,  T, 
lztl  <  E, =  l/k,  t =  l,...,  T, 
where yt  is  defined  by  (A.24)  and 
(vdet- 1)’ 
“=S,  + C: (Vi/ei-1)’ ’ 
(A.25) 
See Bray  [2  or  31 for  details  of these  arguments. 
The  proof  of  the  lemma  is  completed  by  showing  that  for  any  E, >  0  and 
E, >  0,  if  S,  is sufficiently  large,  there  are events D,  to  D,,  such that  lztl  <  F, 
and  I ytJ  <  sy for  all  t  on  of=,  Di,  and  P(nf=  r DJ  >  rc. To  this  end  let  n be 
a positive  integer  and  define  events  D,  -  D,  by 
D,  =  {co: v;  <  (c *  -  2~)~ SOs, for  all  t <  n}, 
<  +  S,c,  for  all t  <  n 
8(c*  +  2~)~ 
for  all  t >  n  , 
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where 
(A.26)  Q,&&L, 
$  iej-l 
Now  observe  from  (A.23)  and  (A.25) 
so  on  D,,  if  t <  n 
jzt/  <  v: 
S,(c”  -  2E)’  <  EZ 
and  on  D 3 n  D,  , if  t >  n 
/Zt/  <  cc*  +  w  G/t 
(c*  -  2&)2  (Xi  vf)/t  <  &;. 
Thus  on  D,  n  D,  n  D,  lztl  <  E, for  all t.  On  B,,  if  t  < n,  from  (A.24) 
It  is  easy  to  check  from  (A.26),  using  a simple  induction  argument,  that 
i  (VjUi/ej-1)  =  (t  t  1)  Q, -  i  Qi. 
n  n 
Thus  on  DznD,nD,,  if  t>n, 
Thus  on  nir,  Di,  ly,l  < E,, and  Izt/  <  F:  for  all  t.  The  proof  concludes  by 
showing  that  there  exists  an  M  such  that,  jf  S,  is  sufficiently  lar 
p(nfzI  Oil  >  7L 
Observe  that  as  {u:}  is  i.i.d.  and  Ev:  =  c-t  <  03, 
v;/t+o  as  f+ac,  i3.S.  (A.27) 
(  ii 
+  T  ‘q’  &w-J;  as  t +  co  a.~.  (A.28) 
Note  also  from  (A.26),  that  as  U,  and  vt  have  zero  mean,  and  are 338  MARGARET  BRAY 
independent  of  each  other  and  of  past  values  of  Ui,  vi  and  e,,  Q,  is  a 
Martingale,  and 
EQf  =  oicri  5  E(l/iei-,)2  < 
n 
(c*03c)2  $  (W2. 
Thus  from  Kolmogorov’s  inequality  for  Martingales  (Chung  [4,  Corollary  1 
to  Theorem  9.4.1 I),  if  J. >  0 
P(  max  lQi/  <  ,I)  >  1 -  “c2, 
i=fl...m  A2(c*  -  2&)2 
-?  (l/Q2. 
i;: 
(A.29) 
Thus,  from  (A.27)-(A.29),  if  IZ is  sufficiently  large 
W,)  >  (4  +  7r)/5,  i =  3,4,5. 
Note  also  that 
(A.30) 
is  a  Martingale,  and  so  using  Kolmogorov’s  inequality  for  Martingales,  for 
any  1  >  0 
Thus,  given  n,  if  S,  is  sufficiently  large 
P(D,)  >  (4  +  rc)/5.  (A.3  1) 
As  {v,]  is  i.i.d.,  if  S,  is  sufficiently  large 
P(D,)  >  (4  +  7c)/5.  (A.32) 
Thus  from  (A.30)-(A.32),  there  exists  an  n  such  that,  if  S,  is  sufficiently 
large 
P  ($Dp=J  (QD;)  +(D;)  <  l--. 
(Here  Df  is  the  complement  of  the  event  Di  in  J2.)  Thus,  as  required, STABILITY  OF  RATIONAL  EXPECTATIONS  334 
REFERENCES 
1. L.  E. BLUME, M.  M.  BRAY, AND D.  EASLEY, Introduction  to  the  stability  of rational  expec- 
tations  equilibrium,  J.  Econ.  Theory  26  (1982),  3 13-3  17. 
2.  M.  M.  BRAY, “Learning,  Estimation,  and  the  Stability  of Rational  Expectations,”  Research 
Paper  NO. 550,  Graduate  School  of Business, Stanford,  1980. 
3.  M.  M.  BRAY.  “Expectation  Formation  and  Information  in  Economic  Systems.”  D. Phil. 
thesis,  Oxford,  1980. 
4.  K.  L.  GHUNC?.  “A  Course  in  Probability  Theory,”  Second  Ed..  Academic  Press, New  York. 
1974. 
5.  S.  J.  GROSSMAN AND J.  E.  STIGLITZ, Information  and  competitive  price  systems, Amer. 
&on.  Rev. 66  (19761,  246-253. 
6.  S.  .I.  GROSSMAN AND  J.  E.  STIGLITZ,  On  the  impossibility  of informationally  efficient 
markets,  Amer.  Econ.  Rev.  70  (1980),  393-408. 
7.  J. JCIHNSTON.  “Econometric  Methods,”  McGraw-Hill,  New  York.  !972. 
8.  3.  M.  KREPS,  A  note  on  “Fulfilled  Expectations”  equilibria.  J. Con.  i”heov>l 14  (1977). 
32-43. 
9.  A.  &LLNER.  “‘An  Introduction  to  Bayesian  Inference  in  Econometrics,”  Wiley.  New  York, 
1971. 